

Aspects of Greek Orthodox Fundamentalism*

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Introduction

The term fundamentalism is widely and inflationarily used nowadays and applied to a variety of phenomena ranging from the religious to the political domain. Though originally based on a series of 12 brochures »**The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth**«, which appeared between 1910 and 1915, coined by Curtis Lee Laws in 1920 and used to describe some forms of Protestantism in the USA in the early 1920s¹, the term later referred to phenomena within Islam² (e.g. in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, but also in Europe), Judaism³, Hinduism and Marxism or even to militant factions within political parties (e.g. the fundamentalist wing of the »Greens« in Germany)⁴. Objections were raised, however, against the generic use of this term, since the phenomena it describes present basic differences and idiosyncratic features. To mention an example, W. Shepard in a cross-examination of Christian (Protestant) and Islamic fundamentalism argued that these phenomena, apart from their common features (e.g. the opposition to modernism), present differences that deny them a common label. In his opinion, the term »fundamentalism« is still valid for the Protestant Christian forms for which it was originally used; in the Islamic case, however, he preferred the term »Islamic radicalism«, whereas for a cross-cultural comparison of these phenomena he suggested the term »radical neotraditionalism«⁵.

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¹ On American fundamentalism see *E.R. Sandeen*, *The Roots of Fundamentalism. British and American Millenarianism, 1800–1930*, London — Chicago 1970. *J. Barr*, *Fundamentalism*, London ²1981. *G. Marsden*, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, Oxford 1982. *M. Riesebrodt*, *Fundamentalismus als patriarchalische Protestbewegung. Amerikanische Protestanten (1910–28) und iranische Schiiten (1961–79) im Vergleich*, Tübingen 1990.

² See *R. Peters*, *Islamischer Fundamentalismus: Glaube, Handeln, Führung*, W. Schluchter (ed.), *Max Webers Sicht des Islams*, (stw 638), Frankfurt a. M. 1987, p. 217–241.

³ See *W. Freund*, *Jüdischer und islamischer Fundamentalismus: Entsprechungen, politische Konsequenzen*, *Der Orient* 28 (1987) 216–228.

⁴ Concerning various forms of fundamentalism see *L. Caplan* (ed.), *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism*, London 1987. *T. Meyer* (ed.), *Fundamentalismus in der modernen Welt. Die Internationale der Unvernunft* (es 1526), Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 81–303. Cf. *idem*, *Fundamentalismus. Aufstand gegen die Moderne*, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1989, p. 15–20.

⁵ *W. Shepard*, »Fundamentalism« Christian and Islamic, *Religion* 17 (1987) 355–378. See also the discussion on this article: *Religion* 19 (1989) 275–292. Cf. also W. Shepard, What is »Islamic Fundamentalism«?, *Studies in Religion* 17 (1988) 5–26.

It is therefore appropriate to say from the outset that the term »fundamentalism«, although it eludes precise definition, in the present paper is understood in a generic sense as indicating an emphasis on the fundamentals, the essentials, i.e., on what has been most important for and distinctive to a religious tradition. So, fundamentalism functions as a main defensive mechanism against ideas and currents that may threaten the preservation of a religious tradition. For example, fundamentalists in the USA opposed the modernist and liberal trends within Protestantism by attaching importance to five fundamentals, i.e., the inerrant inspiration of the Bible, the virgin birth of Christ, the substitutionary atonement, the bodily resurrection of Christ, and either his deity or his second advent. As far as the Greek Orthodox milieu is concerned, a similar phenomenon can be observed, since we are dealing with a closed religious body which tries at all costs to maintain the Orthodox tradition unaltered. This preoccupation has led to the formation of specific patterns of thinking and behaviour which, in the author's view, may properly be called »Greek Orthodox fundamentalism«. What needs to be said here is that Orthodoxy, understood in the literal meaning of the term, neither indicates simple religious conservatism, conformity, or antiliberal tendencies, nor should it be confused with some sorts of fundamentalism, as is sometimes the case in modern sociological literature⁶. Within the Greek religious milieu, the term rather expresses the deeply rooted conviction that the Orthodox Church possesses the sole true faith, initially revealed by Jesus Christ and subsequently guarded by the Church as its most precious treasure. Before dealing with Greek Orthodox fundamentalism in detail, some explanatory notes are necessary:

i) The term »fundamentalism« is not used here with any pejorative connotations, as is often the case in both academic and journalistic circles, but simply serves to properly designate a phenomenon within the Greek Orthodox Church which presents similarities as well as differences to other sorts of fundamentalism. This does not exclude, however, the existence of another, perhaps more appropriate, term to describe the same phenomenon (e.g. rigorism, zealotism, traditionalism, radicalism, integrism⁷).

ii) On the one hand, the facets of Greek Orthodox fundamentalism can *mutatis mutandis* be observed among other Orthodox Churches (e.g. in Russia), since they are basically derived from the same religious tradition, notwithstanding the differing socio-cultural settings. On the other hand, some of these features can better be understood within their historical context, i.e., during certain periods in the history of the Greek Church (e.g. the Ottoman domination), whereas others are more salient in its contemporary forms.

iii) Given this fact, it is absolutely necessary to clearly designate the bearers of the fundamentalist characteristics within the Greek Church. First, these are conspicuous among several independent organizations and movements within the Church (e.g. the brother-

⁶ See J.D. Davidson—G.J. Quinn, Theological and Sociological Uses of the Concept »Orthodoxy«, *Review of Religious Research* 18 (1976) 74–80.

⁷ C. Yannaras [Orient-Occident. La signification profonde du schisme. Un entretien avec Christos Yannaras, *SOP* 150 (1990) 31] spoke of a small number of »integrists« within the contemporary Greek society who, according to our terminology, correspond more or less to the Greek fundamentalists.

hoods Zoi, Sotir, Stavros, Lydia)⁸ or especially within the »Πανελλήνιος Ὁρθόδοξος Ἐνωσις« (= Panhellenic Orthodox Union), around which a considerable number of theologians, metropolitans, clergymen and monks is gathered. Secondly, the same features can be observed among several Eastern monks (e.g. on Mount Athos) or among movements outside the Church of Greece (e.g. the Old Calendarists)⁹. What needs to be especially emphasized here is that the Official Church is not directly related to such groups and generally holds moderate positions on certain issues, whereas fundamentalists are usually more conservative and uncompromising as far as the Orthodox fundamentals are concerned. We must also keep in mind that Greek fundamentalism is not a homogeneous and coherent but rather a *multidimensional phenomenon*, the characteristics of which depend on each particular movement and on the individuals involved in it. Although generalizations are bound to be hazardous at best, the main objective of this paper — an audacious undertaking — is to present a typology of Greek fundamentalism based on ideal-typical distinctions, to which Greek reality may be compared. Having chosen this Procrustean bed, we hope at least to bring some order into the diverse manifestations of this phenomenon.

iv) Last but not least, it is relevant to note that the following descriptions with regard to the Orthodox Church of Greece do not depict it completely. There are many clergymen and laymen among its members who are critical towards the fundamentalist trends and try to cope with the difficult task of rendering the Orthodox tradition meaningful to the modern world. This paper, however, will only analyze the fundamentalist phenomenon which nowadays is still considerably expanding within the Greek society, although without gaining firm footholds and solid popular support.

Main Aspects of Greek Orthodox Fundamentalism

For the purpose of this article, it would be more relevant to have a detailed look at the main aspects of Greek Orthodox fundamentalism¹⁰, preeminently in their modern forms, which can be described as follows:

i) The sense of exclusivity, engendered by the feeling of possessing the sole truth, and the subsequent self-sufficiency lead fundamentalists to a closed-mindedness towards

⁸ See V. Makrides, The Brotherhoods of Theologians in Contemporary Greece, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 33 (1988) 167–187. A. Gousidis, Οἱ Χριστιανικὲς Ὁργανώσεις. Ἡ Περίπτωση τῆς Ἀδελφότητος Θεολόγων ἢ »Ζωή«, Thessaloniki 1989.

⁹ On the Old Calendarists see C. Paraskevaidis, Ἱστορικὴ καὶ κανονικὴ θεώρησις τοῦ Παλαιοσημρολογητικοῦ Ζητήματος κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐξέλιξιν αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἑλλάδι, Athens 1982. A. Wittig, Die Bewegung der Altkalender in Griechenland, *Ostkirchliche Studien* 32 (1983) 309–325. The Old Calendarists are taken here into account because, apart from the disputed calendar issue, they follow in principle the Orthodox tradition and show strong signs of fundamentalist mentality.

¹⁰ The socio-historical background of Greek Orthodox fundamentalism will be examined in a future paper.

other religious faiths as well as to an elitism, and often to a rejection of »the others«¹¹ as dangers for Orthodoxy. Fundamentalists see themselves as constituting a »faithful remnant« to be saved in this sinful and corrupted world and as representing the sole authentic form of Christianity. The image of Orthodox believers as being the »God's chosen people«, the »new Israel«, does not appear seldom among them¹². In addition, it must be noted that history corroborates such elitist tendencies. The sense of Orthodox superiority has been evident in the political philosophy of the Byzantine Empire which, due to its Orthodoxy, felt superior to other peoples and accordingly legitimized its political aspirations. The same occurred after 1453 with Moscow, the third Rome, which was meant to be the sole bearer and guardian of Orthodoxy within the scope of Tsarist (foreign) policies¹³. Such elitist tendencies can nowadays be observed *par excellence* among the various factions of Old Calendarists who not only reject the Official Church of Greece but also each other as well. Such attitudes have generally been intensified in the last decades of the twentieth century due to the globalization process, i.e., »the consolidation of earth's nations and societies into an integrated, *evolving world system* of economic-political relations«¹⁴. If the entire world becomes »a single place«, then the strong interdependence between the various societies, the growth of consciousness pertaining to the globe as such and the cultural pluralism pose serious threats to exclusive claims for truth¹⁵ and thus challenge the Orthodox superiority. The passionate reaction of fundamentalists against this relativizing process is quite obvious. It is probably accurate to say that we are dealing here with a kind of »psychical truth« in C. G. Jung's terminology¹⁶. Orthodox Christians generally have strongly been influenced by the idea of being in possession of the sole truth for many centuries now. Fundamentalists specifically are often pathologically attached to this conviction which, subsequently, becomes an essential part of their identity. Since its rejection or relativization would automatically threaten their whole being, they do not even think of calling it into question. They do not tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty in life. Orthodoxy is a *conditio sine qua non* for finding meaning and hope in the world. The problem is, however, that Orthodoxy as being the right faith is, in many cases, not the result of an experiential process, but of a simple repetition and a mere verbal confession. Children within fundamentalist circles begin with a legacy of received and often unexamined value commitments, i.e., that they are raised within the

¹¹ Cf. G. W. Hartz–H. C. Everett, Fundamentalist Religion and its Effect on Mental Health, *Journal of Religion and Health* 28 (1989) 209.

¹² Cf. A. Makrakis, Hellenism and the Unfinished Revolution. Twenty Addresses Delivered in Concord Square Athens, Greece in 1866, Chicago 1968, p. 166–175. A similar phenomenon appears within Protestant fundamentalists who consider the USA as the »new Israel« and as »the reign of God in America«. See M. Riesebrodt, Protestantischer Fundamentalismus in den USA (EZW-Texte, 102), Stuttgart 1987, p. 13.

¹³ See N. Zernov, Moscow. The Third Rome, London 1942. H. Schäfer, Moskau, das dritte Rom, Frankfurt a. M. 21957.

¹⁴ A. Shupe–J. K. Hadden, Is There Such a Thing as Global Fundamentalism? J. K. Hadden–A. Shupe (eds.), Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered. Religion and the Political Order, Vol. 3, New York 1989, p. 115.

¹⁵ Cf. R. Robertson, The Sacred and the World System, P. E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in a Secular Age, Berkeley 1985, p. 347–358.

¹⁶ C. G. Jung, Antwort auf Hiob, *idem*, Gesammelte Werke 11. Zur Psychologie westlicher und östlicher Religion, Zürich–Stuttgart 1963, p. 387–388.

only true faith, and so on. It is very likely therefore that they will strongly and fanatically be attached to this ideological construction even before they come of age. Needless to say, the repetition of the same stereotype on a large scale (and not always by fundamentalists) has proven to be a tenacious source of problems for the Orthodox Church in Greece nowadays¹⁷.

This spirit of self-sufficiency unavoidably leads to religious complacency and triumphalism. Fundamentalists are used to boast about Orthodoxy, to idealize its history, and to leave no room for objective evaluations. Self-critique is scrupulously ignored or overlooked. They also overemphasize some positive opinions of Western theologians concerning the importance of the Orthodox tradition in the modern world¹⁸. This eulogy not only strengthens their self-confidence; it also has another important social function: It counterbalances their inferiority complex with regard to other nations, especially those in (Western) Europe. In the wake of the Ottoman domination, Greece, for understandable reasons, could not follow the developments of (Western) Europe. The result was the appearance of a wide discrepancy between these two worlds in numerous domains (e.g. in education, science, industry) and of an inferiority complex among the Greeks generally. Many of them considered (Western) Europe as an ideal model worthwhile to be imitated, especially after the eighteenth century. The aforementioned complex has not vanished yet, although Greece is now a full member of the European Community. This is made obvious in greater or lesser measure in the widespread xenomania, i.e., the uncontrolled and illogical trend to indiscriminately prefer foreign lifestyles and products to the respective Greek ones. Up to a point, this inferiority is not imaginary but a real fact if one takes into consideration economic, industrial, or scientific achievements. Several defensive nativistic mechanisms were used by modern Greeks for the purpose of overcoming this inferiority and building up a basis of self-affirmation within this competitive world. One of them was the overemphasis placed upon the magnificent achievements of Ancient Greeks, their ancestors. Fundamentalists, however, like to stress more the superiority and distinctiveness of Orthodoxy over the other Christian traditions. Such a religious superiority is regarded by them as much more valuable than scientific or economic achievements. This spirit has very aptly been illustrated by the ecclesiastic Athanasios Parios (ca. 1721–1813) who sharply reacted against the attempted Europeanization of Greece out of concern for its cultural and religious integrity. In his opinion, one did not have to pity eighteenth-century Greece because of the absence of men like Democritus, Plato, Zenon, and Eucleides or like Newton, Wolff, and Locke who had solely dealt with transient and vain issues. But rather, one should sympathize with Greece because of the absence of men like Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian, John Chrysostom, Athanasius of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria, and Augustine. They were the real philosophers and their Christian zeal and faith have vanished since then¹⁹. In a similar way, fundamentalists try nowadays to compensate for the deprivation of Greece in other domains by stressing the

¹⁷ See the very interesting remarks by C. Malevitsis, 'Η Ὁρθοδοξία, Καθημερινή (13 October 1990).

¹⁸ Cf. E. Mastroiannopoulos, *Nostalgia for Orthodoxy*, Athens 1959.

¹⁹ A. Parios, 'Αντιφώνησις πρὸς τὸν παράλογον ζῆλον, τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἐρχομένων φιλοσόφων [...], Trieste 1802, p. 26–27.

incomparable value and uniqueness of Orthodoxy as the matrix of truth and by outrightly rejecting alien elements as unimportant and otiose. Therefore, they usually develop a conservatism in order to hinder the intrusion of foreign elements into the Orthodox body²⁰. The profoundly human feature of attempting innovations and striving for the new is severely controlled. The basic means of defense against the new is a strong nativistic traditionalism equated in several cases to an obscurantism²¹. An absolutization process has also taken place and no distinction can be made between the elements of the tradition which are susceptible of change and those which are not. Tradition is viewed by them as a taboo, and every attempt to change even a secondary element in this inviolable corpus is strongly repudiated. A direct consequence of this attitude is the dogmatism and the authoritarianism²² with which all possible issues are treated. There is a strong belief among fundamentalists that the Orthodox tradition can answer all potential questions with claims of universal applicability, therefore looking for alternatives seems to them useless. Every attempt to adapt the tradition to the modern world often appears to them as a betrayal of Orthodoxy. In their view, the world is not a criterion for modifying Orthodoxy *ad libitum*. It would be like adjusting the absolute to the relative and transient²³.

ii) Among fundamentalists one can further observe a constant fear of real or (usually) imaginary enemies inexorably having designs against Orthodoxy. They feel to be under continuous threat. Their enemy obsession is mostly grounded on the belief that they are in possession of the truth which is, according to their scenarios, deadly hatred by the outsiders. Even if there are no obvious dangers, they usually tend to invent them and depict with exaggeration and imagination the evil plots aimed at the destruction of Orthodoxy. As a result, they not only build up a community of solidarity in order to exclude all enemies, but also embark on an ideological or even active show-down against them. Historically speaking, the main danger felt by the Orthodox believers originated from the Roman Catholic Church and its expansionist policy. The problem today is, however, that the initially religious antithesis between the two Churches turned into a broader clash of the two worlds. The West (in eighteenth-century Greece indistinctly called »Europe«) was for many Orthodox conterminous with a place out of which solely dangers for their religious tradition had originated. Consequently, the West was rejected as a whole, not

²⁰ Similar trends can be observed in the Islamic world. The strong tide of Western influences (»Westoxication«, »Weststruckness«), in the wake of the onslaught of European imperialism during the last two centuries, posed serious threat and challenge to the unity of Muslim believers as well as to the identity of Muslim societies and was a principal cause for the emergence of the manifold Islamic revivalist opposition. See *Shepard*, What is »Islamic«, p. 11–13. *J. Paul Rajashekar*, »Islamic Fundamentalism«. Reviewing a Stereotype, *The Ecumenical Review* 41 (1989) 64–72. *Riesebrodt*, Fundamentalismus, p. 169–173. Fundamentalists in the USA also criticized alien influences upon their social milieus. See *Riesebrodt*, *ibid.*, p. 63–66, 75–77.

²¹ This traditionalism within the Orthodox Church has repeatedly been criticized: See *D. Savramis*, Die religiösen Grundlagen der neugriechischen Gesellschaft, *M. Nikolinakos*–*K. Nikolaou* (eds.), Die verhinderte Demokratie: Modell Griechenland, (es 302), Frankfurt a.M. ²1969, p. 64–87. *H. Küng*, Theologie im Aufbruch. Eine ökumenische Grundlegung, München–Zürich 1987, p. 78–79, 82–83.

²² Cf. *Hartz*–*Everett*, Fundamentalist, p. 209, 215–216.

²³ Similar claims for absolute truth and exclusivity within another context are being raised by Muslim radicals. See *Shepard*, What is »Islamic«, p. 8–10.

only as useless, but as perilous as well²⁴. Such generalizations, nevertheless, did not enable the Orthodox to discern and to critically evaluate the progress achieved by the West. For example, as modern scientific ideas were gradually introduced into Greece during the eighteenth century, the Church often reacted by taking several measures to prohibit their diffusion. Among the reasons for such an attitude was the fact that modern science was seen as a Western product. The Orthodox could not expect anything good to come of this »heretical and fallen place«! In addition, Greek parents were admonished (e.g. by A. Parios) at that time against sending their children to Europe for further studies. Such a stay abroad could damage their Orthodox faith. This was to a certain extent a legitimate fear because of the anti-Christian and antireligious currents widespread in (Western) Europe; yet the rejection of Western progress *in toto* shows how these prejudices against the West influenced the Orthodox milieu and became an unsurmountable obstacle to taking unbiased decisions. The fact that the enemy is collectively rejected without some degree of precision or the necessary distinctions is a core characteristic of Greek fundamentalists.

Such fears regarding Roman Catholics constitute the anti-Western nucleus of fundamentalist mentality and usually turn into a strong neurosis which persistently and unconsciously influences their overall thinking and decisions²⁵. Any contact with Roman Catholics is, in their opinion, not only a contamination but may lead to the loss of the Orthodox faith as well. And this despite the fact that in the last decades both Churches have come very close to each other and the old feud between them has to a considerable degree been pushed out of the limelight²⁶. The same is true with the fundamentalist reaction against the Protestant denominations, the missionary activities of which became stronger in Greece during the nineteenth century. It is worth noting that anti-Occidental feelings, attitudes, and fears can also be traced nowadays outside the strict fundamentalist milieu (e.g. at the Divinity Schools or even among theologians who did graduate studies in Western Europe). The Divinity School of the University of Athens condemned, for instance, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and the State of Vatican²⁷. It must finally be mentioned that anti-Occidental and anti-European feelings in Greece today are not confined to theological issues alone²⁸.

²⁴ See P. Noutsos, 'Ανατολή – Δύση. Μεταμορφώσεις ενός ιδεολογήματος, Δωδώνη 12 (1983) 81–92. For an example see N. Zacharopoulos, Κινδυνολογία γὰ τὰ ἐκκλησιαστικοπολιτικά πράγματα τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῶν μέσων τοῦ 19 αἰῶνα. Δύο ἀνέκδοτες ἐπιστολὲς τοῦ Κοσμᾶ Φλαμιάτου, ΔΙΑΚΟΝΙΑ. Ἀφιέρωμα στὴ Μνήμη τοῦ Βασιλείου Στογιάννου, Thessaloniki 1988, p. 407–443. Cf. also S. Bilalis, Ὁρθοδοξία καὶ Παπισμός. I. Κριτικὴ τοῦ Παπισμοῦ. II. Ἡ Ἑνωσις τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν, Athens 1969. N. Vasileiadis, Ὁρθοδοξία καὶ Παπισμός ἐν διαλόγῳ (Ἀπὸ τοῦ σχίσματος μέχρι σήμερον), Athens 1981. For the historical background of such attitudes see D. M. Nicol, The Byzantine View of Western Europe, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 8 (1967) 315–339.

²⁵ For an example see S. Agouridis, Ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ Βατικανοῦ καὶ οἱ ὁρθόδοξοι παρατηρηταί, Ἀνάπλασις 120 (1963) 6.

²⁶ See A. Kallis, Orthodoxie und Katholische Kirche: Von der Polemik zum »Dialog der Liebe«, P. Lengsfeld (ed.), Ökumenische Theologie. Ein Arbeitsbuch, Stuttgart 1980, p. 124–151.

²⁷ See Κοινωνία 23 (1980) 81–124.

²⁸ See N. Wenturis, Griechenland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft: die soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen griechischer Europapolitiken, Tübingen 1990. Cf. also P. Dimitras, L'anti-occidentalisme grec, *Contacts* 36 (1984) 350–358.

To mention another example: Fundamentalists are strongly opposed to the participation of the Orthodox Church in the Ecumenical Movement (e.g. in the World Council of Churches)²⁹ despite the fact that the Official Church of Greece and the Patriarchate of Constantinople are very much involved in this movement³⁰. They consider such an openness towards other Christian traditions as eminently dangerous, for in an Ecumenical milieu the differences between the Churches are minimized, the idea of an exclusive religious truth is relativized, and the construction of a syncretist framework within the »Ecumenical melting-pot« is strongly favoured. Thus, by foreseeing their vanishing exclusivity and superiority, fundamentalists strengthen even more their commitment to separatism and their »immune system«. Such an intense dislike against Ecumenism is a core feature of the »Panhellenic Orthodox Union«. In its newspaper »Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος« (= Orthodox Press) and its numerous publications, it constantly criticizes the Ecumenical orientations of the Official Church. The same militant reaction can be observed within the brotherhood »Stavros« led by the Bishop of Florina, Augustinos Kantiotis³¹, as well as among Old Calendarists³². Milder but still essential critiques against Ecumenism are exercised by the brotherhoods »Zoi« and »Sotir«³³. The monks of Mount Athos, which has been a center of Orthodoxy for many centuries now, are usually very critical of the Ecumenical policies of the Official Church³⁴. It is worth noting that anti-Ecumenical trends can also be observed among some professors of theology at the universities³⁵. Yet, to hold to such a rigidity and fanatical irreconcilability in our tolerant era is an unmistakable sign of extreme traditionalism³⁶.

Apart from this, the enemy syndrome leads many fundamentalists to see dangers outside the religious domain, which are usually viewed as an integrated whole within an apocalyptic framework consisting of a general battle between Good and Evil. They call them indistinctly »dark powers« (Σκοτεινὲς Δυνάμεις). The role of Judaism (Zionism)

²⁹ Similar anti-Ecumenical tendencies can be found among fundamentalists in the USA: See E. Glenn Hinson, The Influence of Fundamentalism on Ecumenical Dialogue, *The Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 26 (1989) 468–482.

³⁰ See e.g. N. Nissiotis, Die Theologie der Ostkirche im ökumenischen Dialog, Stuttgart 1968. D. Papandreou, Orthodoxie und Ökumene. Gesammelte Aufsätze, hg. von W. Schneemelcher, Stuttgart 1986. *Orthodoxie et Movement Oecuménique*, (Les Etudes Théologiques de Chambésy, 6), Chambésy–Genève 1986. It must be noted, however, that even some bishops share the fundamentalist negative disposition towards Ecumenism.

³¹ See his recent book 'Η Ὁρθοδοξία ἔναντι τοῦ Οἰκουμενισμοῦ, Athens 1990.

³² See Anon., Διάλογοι τῆς Ἐρήμου περὶ Οἰκουμενισμοῦ, Athens 1972. A. Delibasis, 'Η αἵρεσις τοῦ Οἰκουμενισμοῦ, Athens 1972. Anon., 'Ὁρθοδοξία καὶ Αἵρεσις. Ἄρθρα καὶ σχόλια ἀναφερόμενα εἰς τὴν σύγχρονον αἵρεσιν τοῦ Οἰκουμενισμοῦ καὶ τὴν μεγάλην εὐθύνην τῶν κοινωνούντων ἀμέσως ἢ ἑμμέσως μετ' αὐτῆς (ed. by the Journal) 'Ὁ Ἀγορεύτης«, Athens 1982.

³³ See e.g. G. Psaltakis, Οἰκουμενισμός, Athens 1986. Cf. also M. Rinvoulcri, Anatomy of a Church. Greek Orthodoxy today, London 1966, p. 95–101.

³⁴ See e.g. the photoalbum Φιλήματα Ἰουδα. Ἐκθεσις τῶν προδοτικῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ πράξεων, τῶν πρωταγωνιστῶν τῆς μεγαλύτερας προδοσίας τῶν καιρῶν, πρὸ τῆς ἐλεύσεως τοῦ Ἀντιχρίστου (ed. by the journal) «Ἅγιος Ἀγαθάγγελος», Mount Athos 1985, 21987. Cf. Rinvoulcri, Anatomy, p. 77–80. D. Savramis, Griechenland, Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, hg. von E. Fahlbusch et al., Göttingen 1988, cols. 324–325.

³⁵ See e.g. A. Theodorou, 'Ὁρθοδοξία καὶ Οἰκουμενικὴ Κίνησις, Athens 1970. K. Mouratidis, Οἰκουμενικὴ Κίνησις. Ὁ σύγχρονος μέγας πειρασμός τῆς Ὁρθοδοξίας, Athens 21973.

³⁶ On the anti-Ecumenical trends in modern Greece see also D. Savramis, Ökumenische Probleme in der neu-griechischen Theologie, Leiden–Köln 1964.

in the formation of these »dark powers« is extremely stressed and constitutes a core aspect of modern Greek anti-Judaic feelings. For example, strong emphasis is placed upon the Jewish roots of Marxism-Leninism (i.e., the Jewish descent of Marx, Lenin and Stalin) or of Free-Masonry and other organizations (e.g. Rotary, Lions) which, according to the fundamentalists, conspire against Orthodoxy³⁷. Fundamentalists also reacted against the *de jure* recognition of the State of Israel by Greece in 1990³⁸. The underlying causes of such reactions may be found in the century-old Christian syndrome to consider all Jews as enemies of Christianity *par excellence*. Apocalyptic orientations often lead fundamentalists to anxiously await the coming end of the world and to interpret historical phenomena or natural catastrophes (e.g. the nuclear accident in Chernobyl) from such a standpoint. This apocalyptic frenzy lately turned into a real hysteria due to the number 666, a riddle indicating the name of the Antichrist in the book of Revelation (13:17–18), which was alleged to be some sort of code on new identity cards. A wide range of polemic literature on this theme appeared³⁹, and several demonstrations (the first one on 11 December 1986) against the antichrist plots of subjecting Orthodoxy to the powers of Satan were organized mostly by Old Calendarists (e.g. by the »Ἑλληνορθόδοξο Κίνημα Σωτηρίας« = Greek-Orthodox Salvation Movement). Such apocalyptic scenarios are sometimes transferred to the political domain. The party »Χριστιανική Δημοκρατία« (= Christian Democracy), formerly led by Nikolaos Psaroudakis, who constantly referred to the »dark powers« threatening Orthodoxy and Greece, constitutes an example *par excellence*⁴⁰.

Finally, fundamentalist reactions are also directed against the revival of the ancient Greek spirit⁴¹. For example, Bishop A. Kantiotis has repeatedly criticised such revivals of the paganistic tradition (e.g. the goddess Athena in the insignia of the University of Athens, the naming of streets after the names of Greek gods, the revival of Delphic feasts, Olympism) as dangers for Orthodoxy. He went even so far as to condemn the

³⁷ See e.g. C. Vasilopoulos, 'Η Ἑβραϊομασωνία ξεσκεπάζεται (Ἡ καταχθόνιος δρᾶσις τῆς κατὰ τῆς Κύπρου καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος)', Athens 21975. *Idem*, Τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα τῶν Σκοτεινῶν Δυνάμεων, Athens 31977. *Idem*, Εἰσκέπασμα τοῦ Ρόταρυ, Athens 1980. *Idem*, Εἰσκέπασμα τῆς Θεοσοφίας, Athens 1980. *Idem*, Τὰ Πρωτόκολλα τῶν Σοφῶν. Τὰ σκοτεινὰ σχέδια τῶν Σιωνιστῶν πῶς ἐξελίσσονται σήμερα, Athens 21983. *Idem*, Κατὰ Ἀντιχρίστων, Athens 1988. *Idem*, 'Ο Οἰκουμενισμὸς χωρὶς μάσκα, Athens 51988. E. Theodoropoulos, 'Η Μασωνία ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς τῆς ἀληθείας, Athens 51988. There also exists a number of anti-Semitic books in Greece today which are not strictly confined to the aforementioned fundamentalist parameters.

³⁸ See Χριστιανική (24 May 1990). Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος (25 May 1990).

³⁹ See N. Moulatsiotis, Πότε θὰ γίνῃ ἡ Δευτέρα Παρουσία τοῦ Κυρίου μας; Athens 21986. C. Vasilopoulos, 'Ο Ἀντίχριστος, Athens 41986. A. Kantiotis, 666, Athens 1987. M. Antonopoulou, Μὴν ἀρνηθῆς τὸν Χριστό. Μὴν σφραγισθῆς μὲ τὸ χξς' = 666, Athens 1987. G. Dimopoulos, 'Η Δευτέρα Παρουσία καὶ ὁ Ἀντίχριστος, Athens 31988.

⁴⁰ See N. Psaroudakis, Ἀντίχριστος 666 καὶ ΕΚΑΜ, Athens 31987. *Idem*, Μπροστὰ στὸ μεγάλο πόλεμο. Ἐνα παράθυρο τὰ σκοτεινὰ διεθνή παρασκήνια. Σιωνισμὸς, Μασωνία, Λάϊονς, Ρόταρυ, Προσκοπισμὸς, Θεοσοφία, Οἰκουμενισμὸς, Μάρτυρες τοῦ Ἰεχωβά, Νέα Ἐποχή, Μυστικὲς Ὑπερκυβερνήσεις, Χριστιανικὸ Ἑλληνικὸ Μέτωπο Ὁρησκείας, Πατρίδας, Οἰκογένειας, Ἀνθρωπότητας, Athens 1990. Cf. also his older books Σκοτεινὲς Δυνάμεις καὶ Χριστιανισμὸς, Athens 1964 and Οἱ Σκοτεινὲς Δυνάμεις ἀποκαλύπτονται, Athens 1971 as well as his numerous articles in the newspaper of his party Χριστιανική.

⁴¹ See e.g. Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος (1 June 1990).

symbol of God Hermes in the seal of the Greek Posts. In his opinion, such a symbol was totally inappropriate because Hermes was also the God of thieves and impostors and — more important — he assisted Zeus in doing his moral transgressions! Therefore, Bishop Kantiotis demanded the replacement of this symbol by another one, e.g. by that of a pigeon⁴². A fairly obvious point of similarity can be found with analogous reactions in early nineteenth-century Greece (e.g. in the »Ἀντιφώνησις« by A. Parios), at a time when the Greek nation was striving to acquire a new cultural identity. Such cases are clear indicators of the fact that the alleged very close connection between Hellenism and Christianity (Orthodoxy) and the cultural continuity of the Greek nation from ancient to modern times, which has widely been propagated in Greece since the nineteenth century, need to substantially be reassessed.

The aforementioned facets of the enemy syndrome impinge unavoidably upon the issues of religious freedom and tolerance, two very disputed issues in Greece indeed and certainly at odds with the fundamentalist mentality and praxis⁴³. On the Orthodox side, we should keep in mind that Orthodoxy is constitutionally recognized as the official religion of Greece. This automatically imposes certain restrictions upon the free circulation and competition of ideas other than the Orthodox ones within the Greek »religious market«⁴⁴. We cannot mention here the vast literature discussing the legal aspects of the relevant articles of the constitution⁴⁵, but from the point of view of the Orthodox Church, the propaganda of foreign religious groups, Christian or not, constitutes a major danger for the Orthodox believers. Therefore, there exists a special committee on »antiheretical action«, the purpose of which is the defense against such proselytizing attempts and the enlightenment of the Orthodox Christians. Fundamentalists are much more militant and savage in their critique of such groups (e.g. of the Jehova's Witnesses)⁴⁶. The idea that Orthodoxy signifies the absolute truth constitutes the immediate background of their militancy. They believe to be in serious jeopardy of losing the monopoly of Orthodoxy within the Greek social milieu in case of allowing non-Orthodox to expand their activities and to influence the population. According to P. Berger, »Entmonopolisierung tritt überall dort ein, wo die Religion (genauer: jedes besondere religiöse System) ihren Charakter des einen, umfassenden und als selbstverständlich hingenommenen Vermittlers der

⁴² See Χριστιανική Σπίθα 473 (1990).

⁴³ Cf. E. Simmons, Toleranz und Wahrheit: die Provokation des Fundamentalismus, *Una Sancta* 45 (1990) 4–13.

⁴⁴ Cf. A. N. Marinos, Religiöser Pluralismus und seine Grenzen im modernen Staat, *Una Sancta* 45 (1990) 73: »In diesen Fällen haben wir eine ungemeine Beschränkung der religiösen Freiheit derer, die eine andere Religion praktizieren, und deshalb eine klare Einschränkung des religiösen Pluralismus«.

⁴⁵ See e.g. A. N. Marinos, Ἡ Ὁρθόδοξη ἐλευθερία, Athens 1972. P. Spyropoulos, Die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Kirche in Griechenland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der orthodoxen Kirche, Athen 1981.

⁴⁶ C. Vasilopoulos, Ξεσκέπασμα τῶν Ἱερωβάδων, Athens ⁹1976. *Idem*, Ἡ κατασκοπεῖα τῶν Ἱερωβάδων, Athens ³1973. P. Trebelas, Ὁ Χίλιασμός, Athens ⁸1979. I. Kolitsaras, Οἱ Μάρτυρες τοῦ Γεχωβά, Vols. 1–2, Athens ²1973—³1976. On other religious groups in Greece see F. Heyer, Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften, K. D. Grothusen (ed.), Griechenland, Göttingen 1980, p. 444–447. A. Alevizopoulos, Ψυχοναρκωτικά. Νέες »αἵρέσεις« στὴν Ἑλλάδα, Athens 1980. E. Mantzouneas, Σύγχρονον πανάριον τῶν αἵρέσεων, Athens 1985. A. M. Papadopoulos, Σύγχρονες Αἵρέσεις καὶ ὁρθόδοξη κινήματα στὴν Ἑλλάδα, Thessaloniki 1987.

symbolischen Integration in einer Gesellschaft verliert«⁴⁷. Bearing this in mind, one may rightly cavil at the assumption that religious freedom exists in Greece today. The existence of certain religious minorities is not evidence of religious freedom. Far more important is the free circulation and competition of religious ideas which is legally prohibited in Greece.

iii) Another cardinal characteristic of Greek fundamentalism is the strong fanaticism and the militancy which are expressed in various forms. Fundamentalists tend to consider the Church as a kind of »Public Prosecutor« or as a »police« which, *qua* true, must enforce its views and edicts upon the population, even if use of violence is necessary⁴⁸. They refuse to tolerate differing viewpoints. Occasionally such attitudes resemble a »sacred war« in which fundamentalists get involved for an active implementation of their ideas, especially when the Official Church refuses to go along with such vehement actions. Needless to say, from the fundamentalist point of view, there is no sign of fanaticism in such activities. One can only speak of an ardent zeal and care for the preservation and expansion of Orthodoxy, a fact simultaneously corroborating their *certitudo salutis*.

To be more specific, several aspects of fanaticism can be observed in the overall attitude of Bishop A. Kantiotis and his followers. He has had repeated conflicts not only with Church officials but also with people in the government during his long ecclesiastical career. He has often mobilized his adherents in militant actions against anything (e.g. beauty contests, films) that could, in his opinion, threaten the Orthodox ethos of Greece⁴⁹. Such fierce attacks have also been very frequent among Old Calendarists. A case in point are the lamentable events caused by M. Scorsese's film »The Last Temptation of Christ«: Various fundamentalists went so far as to attack — in the midst of religious hymns and prayers — the cinemas where the film was shown, as well as the spectators, and caused considerable damages. This fanatical spirit is vividly expressed in the following admonition of the newspaper »Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος« (18 October 1988) to Orthodox Christians: »Let us be ›illegal‹ for the sake of Christ and carry with us His blemishes and blames. Many saints would like to live in our hard days in order to receive valuable crowns. Perhaps Christian blood will be shed in the streets of Athens because a ›Church‹ which is not persecuted is not a Church at all«. Such events unavoidably spoil the general image of the Church among the Greek population, since the necessary

⁴⁷ P.L. Berger, Ein Marktmodell zur Analyse ökumenischer Prozesse, *Internationales Jahrbuch für Religionssoziologie* 1 (1965) 248.

⁴⁸ Cf. C. Yannaras, Καταφύγιο Ἰδεῶν. Μαρτυρία, Athens 1987, p. 151–153. Also in the USA, »organized militancy is the feature that most clearly distinguishes fundamentalists from other evangelicals« [G.M. Marsden, Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity, *The Encyclopaedia of Religion* 5 (1987), p. 190–191]. According to M. Marty (A Nation of Behavers, Chicago 1976, p. 94–105), however, evangelicals are basically distinguished from fundamentalists because of their less antiintellectual, more Ecumenical-oriented and more socially active and responsible attitudes. Militancy has also been quite a normal feature within the Muslim world in general. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the writer Salman Rushdie was sentenced to death by A. Khomeini in the wake of his disputed book »The Satanic Verses«.

⁴⁹ Cf. his recent reaction to Theodoros Angelopoulos' film »The Meteor Step of the Stork«: See Χριστιανική Σπίθα 477 (1990).

distinctions between the Official Church and the fundamentalist groups are not always made.

Another aspect of fanaticism can be seen in the extremely negative way with which fundamentalists tend to refer to their opponents. In their publications they usually try to discredit those who dare to criticize them (e.g. the »ecumaniacs« as being muddled and lax in their thinking about Orthodoxy) and firmly believe that their denunciation is instrumental in upholding the Orthodox tradition⁵⁰. In some cases, the accusations brought out by fundamentalists are far from being true, or worse, are deliberately exaggerated and masterfully presented with appropriate labels against their »enemies« (as being atheists or heretics) in order to negatively predispose the (fundamentalist) readership⁵¹. Strong critique is also exercised against certain policies of the Official Church or against scandals provoked by members of the Church Hierarchy. As a result, there often exists tension between the Official Church and the various fundamentalist organizations. The former often tries, though unsuccessfully, to put the latter under control.

iv) In addition, fundamentalists place strong emphasis upon moral issues and stress their own, puritanical, patriarchal ethics and lifestyles⁵². In their view, the welfare of the world depends primarily on personal morality⁵³. Apart from exercising a strong *Gesellschaftskritik*, seeing usually things from a dramatized Manichean perspective, i.e., as a general struggle between Good and Evil, right and wrong, light and darkness within a deeply apocalyptic framework⁵⁴, attempts are made to stay away from the hedonistic habits and values of the modern world (e.g. from drinking, smoking, gambling, theater or cinema attendance, dancing, slacks for women, long hair and beards for men), especially in urban areas. For fundamentalists who continuously see the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, the salvation of their soul is of greater importance than the indulgence in the ephem-

⁵⁰ C. Yannaras has outspokenly criticized this phenomenon: 'Η βία τῶν ἰδεολογιῶν, *idem*, Τὸ κενὸ στὴν τρέχουσα πολιτική. Κριτικὲς παρεμβάσεις στὴ νεοελληνικὴ ἀλλοτρίωση, Athens 1989, p. 41–46. Cf. also his views in Σύναξι 12 (1984) 73–75. Yannaras placed in his critique more emphasis on the psychological motives of such fundamentalist activities (e.g. on the need for self-affirmation through the rejection of the others, on the existential uncertainties and the use of violence to compensate for them).

⁵¹ As Yannaras (Orient — Occident, p. 31) puts it, »ils pratiquent une forme terroriste de chantage réactionnaire à l'égard des évêques, du clergé, des théologiens, et surtout du monachisme athonite. Ce véritable terrorisme est merveilleusement efficace: la grande majorité des prêtres et des moines est contrainte d'ajuster l' »orthodoxie« à la mesure de ce fanatisme psychopathologique. Voilà pourquoi ils sont si nombreux à pratiquer la surenchère en faisant des condamnations hystériques de l' »oecuménisme«, du »libéralisme moral« ou de toutes sortes de fantasmes collectifs. Ils risquent, sinon, d'être stigmatisés violemment et vulgairement comme traîtres de la foi, hérétiques et corrompus«.

⁵² Cf. Hartz — Everett, Fundamentalist, p. 209. Speaking of Protestant and Shī'i fundamentalism, Riesebrodt also emphasized the understanding of such movements as »radical patriarchalist« (Fundamentalismus, esp. p. 244–251). In his opinion, »Fundamentalismus stellt den Versuch dar, patriarchalische Strukturen und Sozial-moral unter sich rapide rationalisierenden Verhältnissen in einem größtmöglichen Ausmaß zu bewahren oder wiederzuherstellen« (ibid., p. 249).

⁵³ Also among Muslim radicals there exists a heavy stress on personal morality, whereby the moral degeneration of the modern West is sharply criticized. See Shepard, What is »Islamic«, p. 13–14.

⁵⁴ A similar phenomenon can be observed among Muslim radicals (see Shepard, What is »Islamic«, p. 22) as well as among fundamentalists in the USA (see Riesebrodt, Protestantischer, p. 12–13). From a comparative perspective, see *idem*, Fundamentalismus, esp. p. 57–71, 153–163, 242–243.

eral, sinful pleasures of the modern world⁵⁵. They are even more militant concerning sexual matters. They not only condemn pornography, homosexuality, abortions, nudist camps and all related transgressions. They are also against the introduction of sex education in the schools because they consider it as potentially dangerous for the moral integrity of the students and as leading to all sorts of immorality⁵⁶. For similar reasons, they have also condemned the unification of the high schools, which were traditionally separated (those for boys from those for girls). In addition, they are at pains to preserve the traditional, patriarchal family values (e.g. they oppose the emancipation of women)⁵⁷. Since fundamentalists are very sensitive to such issues, accusations against their opponents on a moral basis are very common⁵⁸. It should finally be mentioned that moralizing explanations of historical (e.g. the invasion of Cyprus by the Turks in 1974) or physical phenomena (e.g. earthquakes) among fundamentalists are a standing rule. According to Bishop A. Kantiotis, for instance, the strong earthquake in Thessaloniki on 20 June 1978 was caused by the wrath of God due to the increasing number of abortions and blasphemies in Greece⁵⁹. Up to a point, this is by no means a recent characteristic; the same spirit can be observed throughout the history of the Orthodox Church (cf. the moralizing explanations for the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453).

In addition, fundamentalists deeply feel the terror of anomie⁶⁰. Their mobilization and protest against the surrounding, prevailing secular culture with which they are discontented are basically twofold: On the one hand, they aim at transforming it on the basis of their ideals (*Weltbeherrschung*). They feel endangered in view of the urban socio-cultural differentiation and their marginalization as an unimportant subculture. They are vividly interested not only in increasing their societal legitimation claims, but also in the cultural reproduction of their field by instilling sound principles into the young generation. Nativism is here clearly used as an offensive mechanism rather than as a defensive one. The development of a strong social activism⁶¹ (e.g. publishing, missionary work) and of the necessary infrastructure (private schools, suborganizations for various societal strata) is a direct consequence of this spirit. In this way, they do not intend to deal with the problem of theodicy passively, i.e., by expecting justice and rewards in the afterlife. They want to deal with it primarily here and actively. Fundamentalist activities may show either reformist tendencies without rejecting the political institutions or radical and revolutionary orientations by demanding a total destruction of the present society and the building of a new one. On the other hand, fundamentalists may also show a predilection for other-worldliness. This means in principle that they have to live in this world, but that they do

⁵⁵ Cf. similar attitudes among fundamentalists in the USA: *Riesebrodt*, *Protestantischer*, p. 12–13.

⁵⁶ On this disputed issue in Greece see *Σεξουαλική Διαπαιδαγώγηση. Διεπιστημονικό συνέδριο* (Athens, 31 March–1 April 1979), *A. M. Stavropoulos* (ed.), Athens 1981.

⁵⁷ On this issue from a broader perspective see *D. Savramis*, *Die Marienverehrung als frauen- und sexualfeindliche Ideologie, Sozialwissenschaftliche Sexualforschung* 2 (1989) 221–228.

⁵⁸ On the social function of such accusations see some examples provided by *Yannaras*, *Καταφύλιο*, p. 151–153, 241–249, 289–291.

⁵⁹ See *Χριστιανική Σπίθα* 396 (1978).

⁶⁰ See the eloquent discussion of this point by *Riesebrodt*, *Fundamentalismus*, p. 239–241.

⁶¹ Cf. *Hartz–Everett*, *Fundamentalist*, p. 209. Activism is also a common feature among Muslim radicals. See *Shepard*, *What is »Islamic«*, p. 18–19.

not belong to it by constantly viewing it *sub specie aeternitatis*. It signifies also an exodus (*Weltflucht*) — not only a local one — from the modern world and the building of a community (e.g. in a monastery) where the principles of the ideal society may be realized. Yet these two main trends of social activism and otherworldliness are not always compatible with one another. The first one is mainly practiced by the religious brotherhoods, whereas the second one has traditionally been a feature of Eastern monks. The latter often accused the former of deviating from the Orthodox ethos and of being influenced by Western prototypes of social activism and engagement. Relevant to this point is also the distinction between a »rational« (e.g. preeminently within the brotherhoods) and a »charismatic« fundamentalism (e.g. among popular religious movements in the nineteenth century⁶² as well as among Eastern monks)⁶³. What, however, both trends have in common is the complete disregard of the negative responses of the secular culture towards the fundamentalist ideals and activities. The sense of exclusive truth, superiority, and elitism is the underlying cause of such an attitude. It is also possible that unsuccessful reformist attempts may lead either to revolution or to escape from the world. In the Orthodox Church such developments have driven some devotees to extremes. For example, some extremists among the Old Believers in Russia went so far as to commit mass suicide (over 20.000 persons from 1680 to 1693) within a climate of apocalyptic excitation in view of the deadly feared hostile forces which were thought to be triumphant in the world and were expected to intervene⁶⁴.

v) Within fundamentalist circles strong Hyper-Orthodox trends may easily be developed. Hyper-Orthodoxy (Ὑπερρθοδοξία) in the Greek case can be defined as the tension between the various fundamentalist organizations who suspect the Official Church or each other of betraying Orthodoxy. There exists, theoretically at least, a common ground among such organizations. Yet most of them — under the pressure of the enemy syndrome and the deadly feared loss of Orthodoxy — acquire stronger signs of exclusivity and try to separate themselves from the others whenever they suspect »deviations« from Orthodoxy, which is accordingly defined within extremely narrow parameters. The main problem here is that there are no standards and no widely accepted criteria for defining Orthodoxy. Each organization overemphasizes certain aspects of the Orthodox tradition by trying to found them in the past. The alleged unifying elements (e.g. dogmas, liturgical tradition) do not seem to maintain a decisive unity between them, only a superficial one. Thus, apart from their occasional collaboration and coalitions, strong tensions and conflicts are not out of the ordinary (e.g. between the monks on Mount Athos and the brotherhoods, between the »Panhellenic Orthodox Union« and the brotherhoods⁶⁵).

⁶² See M.-J. Le Guillou, La renaissance spirituelle du XVIII^e siècle, *Istina* 7 (1960) 95–128. See also A. Argyriou, Spirituels néogrecs (XV^e–XX^e s.), Namur–Belgique 1967.

⁶³ The aforementioned remarks are mainly based on a typology of fundamentalism developed by Riesebrodt (*Fundamentalismus*, esp. p. 20–23).

⁶⁴ See T. Robbins, Religious Mass Suicide Before Jonestown: The Russian Old Believers, *Sociological Analysis* 47 (1986) 1–20. *Idem*, Reconsidering Jonestown, *Religious Studies Review* 15 (1989) 32–37.

⁶⁵ See for example the controversies concerning the book *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος καὶ ἡ παιδεία τοῦ γένους μας. Κείμενο τῆς ἱερᾶς κοινότητος τοῦ Ἁγίου Ὄρους*, Mount Athos 1984. See also the disputes concerning some views of Prof. P. Trebelas (brotherhood »Sotir«), which were criticized by some fundamentalists as de-

Hyper-Orthodoxy is also caused by a crisis in the Greek religious identity which has appeared especially since the nineteenth century. The new-born Greek State has heavily been influenced in its way of development by an unprecedented influx of foreign, political, religious, and cultural systems. Thus, it seemed absolutely necessary for numerous believers of fundamentalist provenance to »go back« to the Orthodox past in order to discover the lost Orthodox identity. But what exactly constitutes the Orthodox identity? The answer to this question is quite differently given by fundamentalists and no basic agreement can be arrived at. For example, the phenomenon of the brotherhoods is considered by some as a Protestant influence upon the Orthodox Church and as a violation of its ethos. As a result, in order to find some boundary-posturing mechanisms against the others and to construct its identity, each fundamentalist group overemphasizes certain ideas as constituting the very essence of Orthodoxy, which are, nonetheless, usually ideological projections of its opinions and desires into the past. Since they are based on individual, subjective judgements, some of these ideas are in diametrical opposition to the views professed by other fundamentalist groups, a fact intensifying confusion and Hyper-Orthodox trends. Apart from this, the diversity is caused by the persistent desire to express one's own opinion on theological issues, though most fundamentalists are not capable of seriously dealing with such themes. Thus, by considering themselves able to »do theology«, they commit serious mistakes, contribute to the creation of opposite factions even within the same group, and make it impossible to discern between Orthodoxy and the various competing »Orthodoxies«.

Hyper-Orthodox tendencies may also be developed due to the existing discrepancy between fundamentalist ideals and the actual policies of the Official Church, a fact often leading to conflicts between them. For example, there is a major disagreement regarding the processes of electing new bishops in vacant dioceses. Fundamentalists, considering themselves as an important part of the Church body, want to actively participate in the elections of bishops. They also demand that their opinions and preferences be seriously taken into account. The Hierarchy of the Church, nevertheless, intends to keep for itself the right to decide on such issues. So, the clash of these two opposing trends is in the long run almost unavoidable. Such a case can recently be observed in the diocese of Larissa, Platamon and Tyrnavos. Fundamentalist groups strongly reacted against the election of Bishop Dimitrios (Bekiaris) in 1989 after the sudden death of Bishop Serapheim (Orphanos). The Official Church, helped by the State, tried to impose its views without, however, being able to suppress the fundamentalist opposition. It is highly interesting that fundamentalists were supported by some bishops (e.g. by A. Kantiotis) as well as by numerous believers all over Greece. The direct corollary was a most vehement conflict which has lasted now more than a year and which — the author has been an eyewitness — included: Clashes with the police protecting the bishop, injuries on both sides, scuffles in the midst of religious services, numerous arrests, insults, accusations, prosecutions, and trials, so that there was a lot of talk about such alarming phenomena of

viating from Orthodoxy. See *E. Bastas*, 'Οφειλομένη ἀπάντησις εἰς τοὺς συντάκτας τοῦ »Ὁρθοδόξου Τύπου«, Athens 1984. *K. Mouratidis*, Παναγιώτης Ν. Τρεμπέλας. Ὁ μεγάλος πρόμαχος τῆς Ὁρθοδοξίας (Ἀπάντησις εἰς τὰ γραφέντα κατ' αὐτοῦ), Athens 1985.

»religious hooliganism«⁶⁶. It should be noted, however, that, apart from such fanatical actions, several of the fundamentalist demands (e.g. against the corruption in the Hierarchy of the Church) are quite legitimate and necessary for an amelioration of the Church's societal position and role. Yet, opinions diverge with regard to the means that may be used for this purpose.

A direct consequence of Hyper-Orthodoxy is the appearance of sectarian tendencies which are quite obvious in the fundamentalist overall comportment (e.g. exclusivity, avoidance of the outsiders). These tendencies (in connection, of course, to other circumstances) may lead fundamentalists to split from the main Church body and independently follow a new path as a »faithful remnant«⁶⁷. This can clearly be observed in the case of Old Calendarists who, though they do not belong today to the Orthodox Church of Greece, show perhaps the strongest signs of Hyper-Orthodoxy. Their religious exclusivity also led them to social isolation. Apart from the various independent followers, they mainly form three tight-knit groups which mutually exclude each other. They control about 90 monasteries in the whole country and each group calls itself »Church of the True Orthodox Christians of Greece« in order to be distinguished from the members of the Official Church. The same attitude can be found among Old Calendarist »Zealots« (Ζηλωταί) on Mount Athos who, however, nowadays control only one monastery (Esphigmenou)⁶⁸. These monks believe that they are the most genuine Orthodox in the entire world and have been led to religious and social isolation by heavily criticizing the other monasteries, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the rest of the world on the basis of their Hyper-Orthodoxy. It is also worth noting that Hyper-Orthodoxy has historically been a normal phenomenon among Eastern monks who considered themselves able and competent to judge anything on the basis of their superiority in defining right and wrong. This feeling of self-righteousness has been corroborated by the fact that numerous believers in Greece usually showed extraordinary reverence for the monks and their opinions (e.g. by considering them to stand closer to heaven / to God, thus to be more Orthodox than laymen). Monks have traditionally benefitted from this circumstance in order to broadly disseminate their ideas as being of divine provenance and in order to discredit their opponents as enemies of Orthodoxy. Such a case can clearly be observed in the critique against Veniamin Lesvios, who, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, taught openly the heliocentric system and the plurality of worlds. One of his accusers, Athanasios Parios, had the habit of pseudonymously publishing books (so his »Ἀντιφώνησις«) under the name of monks who allegedly were living on Mount Athos. He did this in order

⁶⁶ The opinions of the Official Church on this conflict can be found in the newspaper Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Ἀλήθεια (e.g. 1 June 1990), whereas the opposite view in Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος (e.g. 1, 8, 15 June 1990 / 6 July 1990). For a more neutral account see the main local newspaper of Larissa Ἐλευθερία.

⁶⁷ This can also be observed among non-Orthodox fundamentalist movements. Cf. for instance the movement of Bishop Marcel Lefebvre within the Roman Catholic Church. See *K. Walf*, *Fundamentalistische Strömungen in der katholischen Kirche*, Meyer (ed.), *Fundamentalismus*, esp. p. 249–251. *K. Kienzler*, *Fundamentalismus und Antimodernismus im Christentum*, *idem* (ed.), *Der neue Fundamentalismus*, Düsseldorf 1990, esp. p. 83–86. *H. O'Leary*, *The Lefebvre Movement. A Catholic Manifestation of Fundamentalism*, *The Australasian Catholic Record* 67 (1990) 401–412.

⁶⁸ Cf. *K. Ware*, *The Church: A Time of Transition*, R. Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s, London 1983, p. 224–225.

to increase the credibility and persuasive power of his accusations⁶⁹. A recent example of such a case of monastic superiority can be seen in the vehement attack of the monk Theoklitos Dionysiatis against Prof. Christos Yannaras, a theologian and philosopher, who — according to the monk — has *inter alia* developed an unorthodox, dangerous, lustful, satanical and erotic philosophy⁷⁰.

vi) Another characteristic of Orthodox fundamentalism is the suspicion with which progress and modern developments in various domains, including of course the religious one, are viewed⁷¹. The issue whether Orthodoxy in general is compatible with modernization still remains to be thoroughly examined; yet some preliminary studies show that the system of values influenced by the Orthodox tradition (e.g. by its *Gefühlsreligiosität*) presents serious obstacles to modernization⁷². Among fundamentalists, their enemy obsession is again a persisting impediment to objectively judge new developments and ideas, religious or not. For example, new insights and theories in philosophy (by Nietzsche, Heidegger), in psychology (by Freud), in social studies (by Marx, Engels), or in natural sciences (by Darwin) are collectively rejected and heavily criticized as nonsense or as posing serious dangers to Orthodoxy⁷³. Even well-known Greek authors, like N. Kazantzakis, are rejected because they were critical to religion. One basic reason for this negative attitude towards innovation, which was stronger earlier but still exists today in both open and latent forms, can be found in the reactionary absolutization of the past, a phenomenon closely connected to the Orthodox traditionalism. In the Orthodox Church,

⁶⁹ See V. Makrides, *Die religiöse Kritik am kopernikanischen Weltbild in Griechenland in der Zeit von 1794 bis 1821* (forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 5.3.

⁷⁰ See Theoklitos Dionysiatis, 'Η ἀίρεσις τῶν Νεορθοδόξων (ὁ Νεονικολαΐτισμός τοῦ κ. Χρ. Γιανναρά, Athens, n.d. *Idem*, 'Ο Νικολαΐτικὸς Ἑρωτισμὸς τῶν Νεορθοδόξων (μὲ θεωρητικὸ τὸν κ. Γιανναρά), Athens 1989. See also the reply by C. Yannaras, 'Ερωτικῶν ἀμφιλογιᾶ ἢ περὶ λιβελλοπράγματος μοναχοῦ, Athens 1989, esp. p. 28–30. Cf. *idem*, *Καταφύγιο*, p. 283. On this controversy see also: Σύναξη 32 (1989).

⁷¹ This seems to be a general feature of fundamentalist movements. See Meyer, *Fundamentalismus*, esp. p. 65–200. Yet one should take into account the different meanings and implications of modernism within various social milieus, since some fundamentalists accept and use modern developments (e.g. modern communication technology by the televangelists in the USA) for their purposes. See P. G. Horsfield, *Religious Television. The American Experience*, New York 1984. Cf. also Caplan, *Introduction*, *idem* (ed.), *Studies*, p. 5–14. On how modern inventions, i.e., the steamships, the steam mills, the factories and the telegraph, were evaluated by a fundamentalist Ottoman Turk, who stood outside the religious establishment of the official *ulema*, see a fascinating text composed between 1880 and 1900 and published by R. Peters, *Religious Attitudes Towards Modernization in the Ottoman Empire*, *Die Welt des Islams* 26 (1986) 76–105. Nor should the conclusion be drawn that the process and the wider influence of modernization will inevitably cause the decline of fundamentalism. It is well-known how the liberal Protestantism in the USA declined and how conservative Churches enormously grew during the last decades. On this issue see D. M. Kelly, *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing*, New York 1972.

⁷² See e.g. S. G. McNall, *Value Systems that Inhibit Modernization: The Case of Greece*, *Studies in Comparative International Development* 9 (1974) 46–63. See also the numerous works and articles by Demosthenes Savramis [e.g. *Griechenland zwischen Tradition und Fortschritt*, *Die Dritte Welt* 1 (1972) 101–118]. Such opinions, however, should not be generalized, since one may encounter some opposite examples: See N. Kokosalakis, R. Cipriani and R. van Boeschoten, *Aspects of Cultural and Religious Life in a Corfiote and a Sardinian Village, Secularization and Religion: The Persisting Tension*. Acts of the XIXth. International Conference for the Sociology of Religion, Tübingen 1987, 25–29 August, p. 229–235. See also N. Kokosalakis, *Religion and Modernization in 19th Century Greece*, *Social Compass* 34 (1987) 223–241.

⁷³ For such examples see N. Vasileiadis, *Χριστιανισμός καὶ Ἀνθρωπισμός*, Athens 1978, p. 185–263.

the past generally holds a clear superiority over the present and the future. For example, the Apostolic times or the »Golden Age« of Cappadocian Fathers are usually seen as being incomparably better than the present age (e.g. as far as the quality of Christian lifestyles and of theological production is concerned). In addition, the taboo-like dimensions of the past are caused by its idealization. This means that emphasis is solely placed upon the positive sides of the past, whereas its negative dimensions are neglected or deliberately passed over in silence. Fundamentalists generally show a staunch desire to return to the pristine condition which in the flow of history degenerated and finally vanished. Since the whole structure of the Church is based upon the past, which serves as a basic reference and identification point (e.g. the New Testament, the decisions of the councils, the works of the Church Fathers), it necessarily follows that this is also the case with the claims of the Church for absolute truth⁷⁴. More specifically about Greek fundamentalists, they are used to legitimize their ideals and *Weltanschauungen* by reference to an old, established corpus of sacred texts which — usually understood literally — are taken for granted as constituting timeless and infallible verities⁷⁵. Nevertheless, this constant preoccupation for seeking religious truth solely in the past was generalized and transformed into a predominant predisposition to seek the truth always in earlier times and to measure modern developments by standards drawn from the elapsed golden ages. This is of course equated to an obscurantism which hinders any attempts for progress and free inquiry. This can be observed in the eighteenth century when new scientific ideas were denied because the knowledge accumulated in the past was thought to be sufficient and definitive in the scientific domain. Therefore, it was not seen necessary to question old authorities and no progress was expected in the future⁷⁶. Although this attitude can by no means be maintained nowadays, fundamentalists still tend to deny or to suspiciously view various human achievements and to look for answers in an idealized past⁷⁷.

Another related feature of fundamentalist mentality is the opposition to intellectualism which is expressed in the lack of appreciation regarding the principles of free inquiry and thinking (e.g. in universities, research centers). In fact, fundamentalists, by thinking of possessing the sole truth, are reluctant to establish totally antiauthoritarian criteria in research and to look for progress in all domains. Intellectualism, through a contextual and historical analysis of the circumstances out of which a religious tradition was born and

⁷⁴ This seems *mutatis mutandis* to be a general feature of fundamentalist movements. As Riesebrodt (Protestantischer, p. 4) puts it, fundamentalism »die Ursache für die Krise einer Gesellschaft im Abfall von ewig gültigen, göttlich offenbarten und schriftlich-wörtlich überlieferten Ordnungsprinzipien sieht, die in einer idealen Gemeinschaft schon verwirklicht waren [...] Fundamentalistisches Denken bedeutet also keinen utopischen Entwurf in die Zukunft, sondern eine mythische Orientierung an einer idealisierten Vergangenheit«. The desire to »go back« to a past period may acquire two forms according to Riesebrodt (Fundamentalismus, p. 19–21): A mythical, i.e., a exact restauration of the »Golden Age« and a utopian, i.e., a more »progressive«, socially reforming and revolutionary overcoming of the crisis, based not on the »letter« but on the »spirit« of the pristine period.

⁷⁵ Cf. Caplan, Introduction, p. 14–21.

⁷⁶ See V. Makrides, Science and the Orthodox Church in 18th and Early 19th Century Greece: Sociological Considerations, *Balkan Studies* 29 (1988) 267–271.

⁷⁷ Due to the peculiarities of Greek religious milieu and the emphasis placed upon the preservation of Orthodoxy, this kind of traditionalism does not exactly correspond to the »radikal« or the »radikalisierte Traditionismus« which is eloquently outlined by Riesebrodt (Fundamentalismus, esp. p. 215–216).

developed, tends to relativize the very notion of truth. This is seen as a clear onslaught on the fundamentalist theory of truth as being of divine origin and as transcending history. Especially after the institutionalization and the functional autonomy of the universities in Greece as well as after the emergence of anti-Christian or antireligious trends (e.g. the authority of the reason over revelation, attack on the supernatural) among scientists, fundamentalists became keenly aware of the dangers of intellectualism and opposed them passionately. This has happened in the nineteenth century already. For example, Apostolos Makrakis (1831–1905), a popular preacher, called the university of Athens, »τὸ Πανεπιστήμιον« (i.e., the center of all human knowledge) »Πανσκοπιστήριον« (i.e., center of all darkness and obscurantism), a play on words in the original Greek⁷⁸. Such reactions were also directed against the development of Greek academic theology under the influence of the German Protestant tradition⁷⁹. New radical theories, e.g. concerning biblical criticism, even professed in transmuted and milder forms by Greek theologians, were viewed as extremely dangerous for the preservation of the Orthodox tradition. The same can be observed nowadays. Though the theological schools of Athens and Thessaloniki are confessionally Orthodox, their relations to the fundamentalists (but also to the Official Church) cannot be considered as entirely smooth. Fundamentalists also accuse the professors in these schools of being preoccupied with theology solely as a dry, intellectual activity, of neglecting the actual problems of the believers by avoiding the »theology of praxis«, and, most important, of showing a predilection for non-Orthodox positions. Moreover, they strongly react against the old and still existing tradition among Orthodox theologians to do graduate studies abroad. In their view, any contact with foreign theological circles and lifestyles finally leads to the loss, or at least to the relativization of Orthodoxy. It should be noted, however, that the contemporary critique on academic theology in Greece is not solely restricted to the fundamentalist camp. The same has repeatedly been done by others, e.g. by Prof. C. Yannaras.

It has generally been hypothesized that fundamentalist attitudes are relatively stronger among less educated people as opposed to young, educated, and cosmopolitan persons⁸⁰. Nonetheless, this means neither that among fundamentalists one cannot find intellectuals or well-educated persons, and even converted ones⁸¹, nor that fundamentalists remain unaffected by modern developments. Whenever fundamentalists accept modern beliefs or integrate them into their lifestyles, they tend to give them a different meaning and to use them for their own purposes⁸². Therefore, one should take into account the various fun-

⁷⁸ See A. Angelopoulos, *Griechenland*, *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* 14 (1985), p. 220. Makrakis was also against the reestablishment of the Olympic Games.

⁷⁹ See G. Metallinos, *Das Problem der deutschen Einflüsse auf die griechische akademische Theologie in der Gründungsphase der Athener Universität*, *Orthodoxes Forum* 3 (1989) 83–91.

⁸⁰ Cf. S. Johnson–J. Tamney, *Support for the Moral Majority: A Test of a Model*, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 23 (1984) 183–184.

⁸¹ See R. Burton–S. Johnson–J. Tamney, *Education and Fundamentalism*, *Review of Religious Research* 30 (1989) 344–359.

⁸² See e.g. J. Tamney–S. Johnson, *Fundamentalism and Self-Actualization*, *Review of Religious Research* 30 (1988) 276–286. The same can be observed among anti-Western Muslim radicals, who nonetheless are willing to borrow Western ways, but only according to their own preferences and needs. See Shepard, *What is »Islamic«*, p. 15–16.

damentalist strata in order to see their respective attitudes to these issues⁸³. The same is true as far as Greece is concerned. As mentioned above, there are several professors at the University who collaborate or feel close to fundamentalist groups, even if they do not share their militancy. The same happens with several bishops, although the Official Church generally tries to avoid closer ties with such groups. Fundamentalists also make use of modern developments (from the intellectual to the technological domain) in their efforts to corroborate and to effectively disseminate their *Weltanschauungen*, but only when they do not feel any danger for the Orthodox tradition. The criteria of this selectivity are, nonetheless, not clearly defined: One may encounter, on the one hand, an impressive openness towards the use of modern technology for missionary purposes, and on the other hand a strong conservatism in other issues⁸⁴. For instance, the architecture of Orthodox churches outside Greece does not always follow — usually for understandable reasons — the traditional Byzantine style. In some cases, the sort of pews, usually found in Protestant or Roman Catholic churches, or the use of musical instruments during the religious services are also introduced into the Orthodox churches. Such »modernizations« are often heavily criticized as deviations from the genuine Orthodox tradition.

vii) Finally, another aspect of Greek fundamentalists is the strong connection between their Orthodox beliefs and their nationalistic plans⁸⁵. It must be said here in passing that there exists a strong interplay between Greek ethnic identity and the Orthodox tradition which has been consolidated especially during the Ottoman domination. In addition, Orthodoxy in both its official and popular forms sacralizes the socio-political Greek system⁸⁶. Politics and Orthodoxy have inextricably been interwoven, while the Orthodox feelings and sensitivities of the population are often (mis)used for political purposes. In our view, therefore, there is no bifurcation between the private and the public sphere within the modern Greek society, as is the case with other Western societies.

Within fundamentalist circles, religious legitimation is usually given to nationalistic dreams. Their basic assumption is that God will help the Greek nation to restore its old power and glory only on condition that the political leaders together with the people will keep the Orthodox faith intact. Examples drawn from the Old Testament are quoted in order to show how the Israelites were helped whenever they were faithful to God, while in the opposite case the direct consequence was punishment. Other examples are taken

⁸³ See *Riesebrodt*, *Fundamentalismus*, p. 31–36. On concrete data drawn from the USA and Iran see *ibid.*, p. 88–106, 180–200, 224–231.

⁸⁴ Cf. *K. Kavarnos*, 'Η Ὁρθόδοξος Παράδοσις καὶ ὁ Συγχρονισμός, Athens 1971.

⁸⁵ This feature has in all probability been nourished by the equally strong and long connection between Orthodoxy and nationalism in Greece. See the critique by A. Schmemmann (*A Meaningful Storm*, *idem*, Church, World, Mission. Reflections on Orthodoxy in the West, Crestwood, NY 1979, p. 85–116). See also S. G. Xydis, *Modern Greek Nationalism*, P. F. Sugar–I. J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle 1969), p. 207–258. J. Karmiris, *Catholicity of the Church and Nationalism*, Procès-Verbaux du Deuxième Congrès de Théologie Orthodoxe à Athènes, 19–29 Août 1976, Athènes 1978, p. 458–482. I. Petrou, 'Εκκλησία καὶ πολιτική στήν Ἑλλάδα (1750–1909), Thessaloniki 1990, p. 154–158.

⁸⁶ See generally N. Kokosalakis, *Populare, offizielle und Zivilreligion. Zur Soziologie des orthodoxen Christentums in Griechenland*, M. N. Ebertz–F. Schultheis (Eds.), *Volksfrömmigkeit in Europa. Beiträge zur Soziologie populärer Religiosität aus 14 Ländern*, München 1986, p. 265–276. *Idem*, *The Political Significance of Popular Religion in Greece*, *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 64 (1987) 37–52.

from the Byzantine era when the *imperium* and the *sacerdotium* were inextricably connected. In addition, the strength of the Byzantine Empire is thought to have been caused by Orthodoxy, its official religion. The Byzantines, in fact, considered themselves as the »chosen people« of God and were absolutely convinced of their superiority which was divinely ordered. Due to the assumption that Christian faith and deeds are rewarded by God on earth as well as in heaven, they regarded the prosperity of the Empire as depending on their lifestyles. »If they abstained from sin, the empire expanded and prospered, the menace of the barbarians receded, and the discords excited by heresy declined. If they did not so abstain, the reverse was the inevitable consequence«⁸⁷. Greek fundamentalists think today in strikingly similar ways. Their thoughts are very often based on apocalyptic concepts. Several biblical prophecies and oracles are interpreted according to »the signs of the times« for such purposes⁸⁸. In this case, we can rightly speak of an »Orthodox dispensationalism«, i.e., of a »systematic scheme for interpreting all of history on the basis of the Bible, following the principle of ›literal where possible‹; biblical prophecies, especially, are taken to refer to real historical events«⁸⁹. Earlier (i.e., during the second half of the nineteenth century up to 1922) such religious / nationalistic plans were strongly connected to the Greek Irredentism, i.e., the liberation of Constantinople and the reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire, an old Greek dream (ἡ Μεγάλη Ἰδέα = the Great Idea)⁹⁰. Although such dreams have not altogether vanished today, fundamentalists strive more for the Greek incorporation of Cyprus and Northern Epirus (today a part of Albania) where many Greek Orthodox Christians live.

It must finally be noticed that, though until recently fundamentalists were paradoxically not very active in the political arena⁹¹, their political preferences usually tend to the right and very often to its extreme forms. There has always been a very strong aversion towards (and fear of) left parties. Especially communists were traditionally and are still viewed as enemies of both Orthodoxy and Greece and collaboration with them cannot be conceived⁹². Some fundamentalist groups cooperated in the anticommunist crusade of the

⁸⁷ R. Jenkins, *Byzantium and Byzantinism*, Cincinnati 1963, p. 4.

⁸⁸ See e.g. anon., *Τὰ ἀναμενόμενα παγκόσμια γεγονότα κάτω ἀπὸ τὸ φῶς τῶν προφητειῶν τῆς Ὁρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας*, Nikosia 1987.

⁸⁹ Marsden, *Evangelical*, p. 192, who, however, has in mind the fundamentalists in the USA. Cf. also *Riesebrodt*, *Protestantischer*, p. 14. For an example from Greece see *Makrakis*, *Hellenism*, p. 94–102 (The solution of the Eastern Question as foreseen by the prophet Habakkuk).

⁹⁰ See A. Pollis, *The Megali Idea: A Study of Greek Nationalism* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The John Hopkins University, 1958). T. Tassios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866–1897*, (East European Monographs, No. CLXI), New York 1984. E. Skopetea, *Τὸ »Πρότυπο Βασιλείο« καὶ ἡ Μεγάλη Ἰδέα. Ὁψεις τοῦ ἐθνικοῦ προβλήματος στὴν Ἑλλάδα (1830–1880)*, Athens 1988.

⁹¹ There is a difference here with regard to the fundamentalists in the USA since the late 1970s and their subsequent active involvement in politics (e.g. the foundation of Moral Majority in 1979 which supported the ex-president R. Reagan, and the candidature of Pat Robertson to win the nomination within the Republican party for the 1988 elections). See R. Liebman–R. Wuthnow (eds.), *The New Christian Right*, New York 1983. M. Toulouse, Pat Robertson: Apocalyptic Theology and American Foreign Policy, *Journal of Church and State* 31 (1989) 73–99.

⁹² For a recent attempt, however, to bridge the gap between Orthodoxy and the left (not among fundamentalists) see V. Makrides, *Neoorthodoxie — eine religiöse Intellektuellenströmung im heutigen Griechenland*,

State after World War II, while others did the same during the military regime (1967–1974), towards which they were friendly disposed. In addition, the recent dissolution of communist regimes in the former Eastern Bloc was interpreted by fundamentalists as the fulfilment of prophecies and as a triumph of religion / Orthodoxy over outspokenly atheist States. Though the right parties have often used the religious sensitivities of the fundamentalists for their purposes, the latter still prefer them because they consider them as at least indifferent collaborators, if not as serious supporters. As far as the issue of nationalism is concerned, several extreme right groups share the fundamentalists' visions. Thus, they do not hesitate to participate in their activities, though they act out of their own political motives (e.g. in the Northern Epirus issue). As political conservatism usually legitimizes the existing status quo, it is no surprise that some upper class people may be attracted to fundamentalism in order to justify their economic well-being or conservative ideas (on society, morality, etc.). To be fundamentalist is by no means conterminous with being uneducated or belonging to low, deprived classes⁹³.

These are the basic aspects of Greek Orthodox fundamentalism. We can find striking differences by probing deeper and comparing these attitudes of Orthodox Greeks living in Greece with the attitudes of Orthodox Greeks living abroad. If we take into account the Greeks living in the USA, it is obvious that the Orthodox Church plays a significant role among them and functions as a power that holds them together. Yet, American society is a pluralistic society *par excellence* and allows far more religious freedom than Greece⁹⁴. As a result, the Greeks living there, especially the second and third generations, are influenced by this fact and are generally more open towards other religious traditions. They are also sometimes »pressed toward doctrinal relativism by American religious pluralism«⁹⁵. This is a natural consequence, since to hold to a religious exclusivity within such a pluralistic society would undoubtedly cause serious problems in the relationship to other citizens. Therefore, the fundamentalist attitudes that appear within the closed religious system of Greece cannot generally be observed in the American scene⁹⁶. Similar attitudes to those existing in the USA can also be observed elsewhere, e.g. among Greeks in Australia who also live in a pluralistic society⁹⁷. The problem arises when fundamentalists from Greece try to spread out their ideas and lifestyles abroad and are confronted with the different and more open views of Orthodox Greeks living there. Considering the

P. Antes–D. Pahnke (ed.), *Die Religion von Oberschichten. Religion — Profession — Intellektualismus*, Marburg 1989, p. 279–289.

⁹³ Political conservatism and anticommunist tendencies have also been observed among fundamentalists in the USA. See Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, p. 152, 209–211.

⁹⁴ See Marinos, *Religiöser Pluralismus*, p. 72–73.

⁹⁵ T.G. Stylianopoulos, *The Orthodox Church in America, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 387 (1970) 47.

⁹⁶ On the role and the function of the Orthodox Church among Greek communities in the USA see E. Vlachos, *The Assimilation of Greeks in the United States*, Athens 1968, p. 105–110. C. Moskos, *Greek Americans: Struggle and Success*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1980, p. 33–39, 66–75. On American converts to Orthodoxy see T. Doulis, *Journeys to Orthodoxy. A Collection of Essays by Converts to Orthodox Christianity*, Minneapolis 1986.

⁹⁷ See C. Price (ed.), *Greeks in Australia*, Canberra 1975.

entirely different conditions, fundamentalists usually think that Orthodoxy has been betrayed and try to »proselytize« their compatriots, whereas the local Church officials react against this intrusion of fanaticism into their dioceses. As a result, the conflict is in the long run unavoidable. A recent example of such a case can be seen in the dispute between the Bishop A. Kantiotis and the Archbishop of Australia, Stylianos Charkianakis. Followers and collaborators of Bishop Kantiotis visited Australia for missionary purposes and were shocked by what they considered to be deviations from the genuine Orthodox spirit. They severely criticized and denounced various policies of the Archbishop and Bishop Kantiotis demanded the intervention of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Nonetheless, the Patriarchate supported the policies of the Archbishop and ordered Bishop Kantiotis to avoid interventions in the affairs of a diocese outside his jurisdiction⁹⁸. Moreover, in the newspaper »Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος« one can often find sweeping denunciations against allegedly anti-Orthodox actions and policies, not only in the USA or in Australia but elsewhere as well, e.g. in the United Kingdom. These examples clearly show how these two categories of Orthodox Greeks, who were raised in different social and religious milieus, have developed quite distinct attitudes and ideas concerning their religious tradition.

Finally a certain paradox among Greek fundamentalists should be emphasized. Though they intend to preserve their Orthodox tradition as they inherited it and to avoid contact to non-Orthodox, they often borrow the argumentation of Protestant fundamentalists and hold the same positions on many themes! For example, the whole issue of the satanic number 666 was for the most part based on relevant Protestant fundamentalist literature. The same is true as far as the creation / evolution controversy is concerned, a crucial issue among Greek fundamentalists. So, a demonstration was organized against a book for high school students entitled »Ἱστορία τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους« (= History of the Human Race) and written by L. Stavrianos, which openly accepted the theory of evolution. This took place in Athens on 16 February 1985 within the framework of an anti-evolution crusade. Fundamentalists demanded not only the withdrawal of the book from the schools but also its public burning⁹⁹. Yet, although they think to uphold Orthodoxy in this way, their entire argumentation is based upon Protestant fundamentalist literature (e.g. on the book »**Evolution? The Fossils Say No!**« by Duane Gish which has been translated into Greek in 1985)¹⁰⁰. The Protestant views, based on different theological premisses (e.g. on the theory of the »divine dictation« of the Bible¹⁰¹), are not Orthodox,

⁹⁸ Bishop Kantiotis expressed his opinions on this conflict in Χριστιανική Σπίθα 447 (1986) and 455 (1987). As far as Orthodoxy in Australia is concerned and how unfounded the fundamentalist fears are, see M. Chrysavgis, Greek Orthodoxy in Australia: The Tradition of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Australian Community, *Phronema* 1 (1986) 43–54. J. Chrysavgis, Orthodoxy and Australia. Retrospect and Prospect, *Ost-kirchliche Studien* 39 (1990) 193–205.

⁹⁹ See »Ὁρθόδοξος Τύπος (8, 15 February / 1, 8 March 1985).

¹⁰⁰ D.T. Gish, Ἐξέλιξη; Τὰ ἀπολιθώματα λένε OXI! Preveza 1985. Cf. also [D. Kotsakis], Ὁ Δαρβίνος καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, Athens 21983. N. Vasileiadis, Ὁ Δαρβίνος καὶ ἡ Θεωρία τῆς ἐξελίξεως, Athens 1985. A. Frangos, Ἀπὸ τὸν πῖθηκο; Τὰ ἐπιστημονικὰ στοιχεῖα γιὰ τὴν θεωρία τῆς ἐξελίξεως, Athens 21985. G. Kostof, Συμβολὴ στὴν τελετὴ λήξεως τῆς Θεωρίας τῆς ἐξελίξεως. Ἡ πῶς οἱ ἐξελικτικοὶ ἐλίσσονται γὰρ νὰ πείσουν ὅτι τὰ εἶδη ἐξελίσσονται, Athens 1988.

¹⁰¹ See W. Joest, Fundamentalismus, *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* 11 (1983), p. 734–736.

but are used by Greek fundamentalists mainly because they *seemingly* support Orthodox positions. Another reason for such a theological transfer is the fact that some related theological ideas can be found in the Orthodox tradition, e.g. a kind of biblical »fundamentalism«, the origins, the development, and the consequences of which (within the Greek Orthodox Church) we have examined *in extenso* elsewhere¹⁰².

This concludes the description of Greek Orthodox fundamentalism, a phenomenon that, regardless of the ebb and flow of its fortunes, influences the contemporary Greek society to a certain extent and constitutes a specific feature of its religious life.

¹⁰² See Makrides, Die religiöse Kritik, chap. 7.